Canada: Religious Freedom: Incidents abrasive against religious freedom in Canada

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Canada:

International

Religious Freedom

Report 2006

report released by the

US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Source: State Department, US Government (Sep15,2k6)

This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in compliance with Section 102(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998. The law provides that the secretary of state, with the assistance of the ambassador at large for international religious freedom, shall transmit to Congress "an Annual Report on International Religious Freedom supplementing the most recent Human Rights Reports by providing additional detailed information with respect to matters involving international religious freedom."

Canada: The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respected this right in practice.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion.


The generally amicable relationship among religious groups in society contributed to religious freedom.

The U.S. government discusses religious freedom issues with the Government [of Canada] as part of its overall policy to promote human rights.

Section I. Religious Demography [of Canada].

The country has an area of 3,855,101 square miles and a population of approximately thirty-three million. According to a 2001 census, approximately 77.1 percent of the population belonged to Christian denominations or claimed Christianity as its religion. Roman Catholics (44 percent of the population) constituted the largest denomination, followed by Protestant denominations (29 percent). United Church, Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Baptist, and Pentecostal were the largest Protestant groups. The Muslim population stood at 2 percent, and approximately 1.1 percent of the population was Jewish. Other religious groups included Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs, each with approximately 1 percent of the population. Several other religions, such as Scientology, Baha'i, Shinto, Taoism, and aboriginal spirituality, each accounted for less than 1 percent. A total of 17 percent claimed no religious affiliation, an increase from 12 percent in the 1996 census.

An April 2006 Ipsos Reid Survey of Christian religious attitudes indicated that, while Christian beliefs had remained largely unchanged since 1996, fewer persons (17 percent) attended church on a weekly basis. A 2002 Pew Research Center poll on religious attitudes found that approximately 21 percent of the population attended church on a weekly basis.

Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

Legal/Policy Framework

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respected this right in practice. The Government at all levels sought to protect this right in full and did not tolerate its abuse, either by governmental or private actors.

The following Christian holy days are national holidays: Good Friday, Easter Monday, and Christmas Day.

Religious groups are not required to register with the Government. The Government grants tax-exempt status to religious institutions through the Charities Directorate of the tax authority, Revenue Canada. This status provides religious institutions with certain federal and provincial sales tax reductions, rebates, and exemptions, and it requires them to be nonpolitical, send donations only to approved overseas recipients, and undergo periodic audits. Through this same government-approved charitable status, clergy receive various federal benefits, including a clergy housing deduction under the tax code and fast-tracking through the immigration system. Individual Canadians who donate to religious tax-exempt institutions receive a federal tax receipt entitling them to deductions for federal income tax purposes.

The Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms protect the rights or privileges possessed by religious minorities in their public, but denominational, schools at the time of national union in 1867. In practice this protection has meant that some provinces have funded Catholic school education, and some provinces (such as Quebec) have funded Protestant education but under the category of "public," not "private," education. Education falls under the purview of the provinces, not the Federal Government. As such, levels of direct funding and indirect tax benefits for all schools, public as well as private, religious and nonreligious, ranged across the country from 0 to 75 percent.

North America > Canada > Religious Freedom

On November 2, 2005, the UN Human Rights Committee reiterated its 1999 ruling that called on the Federal Government to "adopt steps in order to eliminate discrimination on the basis of religion in the funding of schools in Ontario." The ruling, which resulted from a 1996 complaint filed under Article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on behalf of an Ontario Jewish parent who was sending his child to a Jewish private school, concluded that Ontario's policy of full and direct public funding for only Catholic but not other religious schools was discriminatory. While the issue of public funding for non‑Catholic religious schools in Ontario has been the subject of domestic litigation since 1978, a 1996 Supreme Court ruling confirmed the constitutionality of funding for Catholic separate schools.

On September 11, 2005, Ontario's premier announced his government's intention to end civil enforcement of religious arbitration decisions in the province. Since 1991 the Ontario Arbitration Act had permitted religious organizations to hold tribunals in which marriage, family, and business disputes could be settled according to religious law. The tribunals were voluntary, and tribunal decisions had to comply with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and could be appealed through the court system. With the Family Statute Law Amendment Act of February 23, 2006, religious arbitration in family matters ended, making all family law arbitration subject to civil law. At the end of the period covered by this report, the Ontario government was developing regulations to implement the legislation.

There was no official government council for interfaith dialogue, but the Government provided funding for individual ecumenical projects on a case-by-case basis.

Restrictions on Religious Freedom

Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of religion.

In April 2005 the British Columbia Supreme Court ruled that a fourteen-year-old girl, who was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, could not refuse a blood transfusion as part of her treatment for cancer, despite the girl's protest that her religious beliefs did not allow for blood transfusions. In May 2005 she appealed the decision to a court in Ontario, but the judge refused to hear her arguments and ordered her to return to British Columbia. Subsequently, the government of British Columbia allowed the girl to travel abroad to receive treatment. She returned home in August 2005 after being treated without requiring a blood transfusion.

In September and October 2005, a Sikh law student was twice prohibited from riding on national rail carrier trains because he was wearing a kirpan (ceremonial dagger). Railway company officials, responding to another passenger's complaint and referring to its baggage policy that bans weapons, required that the Sikh passenger disembark, enforcing a company policy that makes no exceptions for religious symbols. The student's appeal to the Ontario Human Rights Commission for redress was pending at the end of the period covered by this report.

In January 2006 the Ontario Human Rights Commission ruled in favor of a woman who alleged she had been the target of discrimination for her belief in Falun Gong. The ruling expanded the commission's working definition of "creed" to include Falun Gong. The claimant had complained that she was harassed about her beliefs at the Ottawa Chinese Cultural Association and ultimately ejected from the group. The association was found liable for breaching Ontario's human rights code on the basis of religion. The claimant received $15,500 (C$18,000) in damages for the loss of dignity and "mental anguish."

In March 2006 the Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in the case of a Sikh student whose Montreal school had prohibited him from wearing his kirpan under its "no weapons" policy. The court ruled in favor of the student, ruling that his religious rights had been infringed. Previously, the Board of Education had alleged that the kirpan presented a safety problem, while the student's family argued that banning the kirpan violated his religious rights. The Ontario Human Rights Commission argued in favor of balancing freedom of religion and safety and security.

Also in March 2006 the Quebec Human Rights Commission decided that a Montreal engineering school must allow its Muslim students to pray in dignity, although the school is not obligated to provide students with a dedicated prayer space. The school had previously blocked Muslim students from praying in school hallways and stairways, leading to the 2003 filing of a complaint. During the sixty‑day period provided by the commission, the two sides failed to reach a "reasonable accommodation" regarding the students' prayer space. Discussions between Muslim representatives and the school continued at the end of the period covered by this report. In December 2005 Muslim students at McGill University filed a similar complaint with the commission, which had not issued a decision on the second complaint.

In March 2005 two complaints were filed with the Alberta Human Rights Commission against the Catholic bishop of Calgary after he stated in a pastoral letter his opposition to proposed same-sex marriage legislation by the Federal Government. Both complaints were later dropped.

In 2004 the police began a continuing investigation of the polygamous community of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS), as a result of allegations of child abuse and statutory rape. The FLDS openly practices polygamy, a criminal offense according to the criminal code. British Columbia attorneys general have stated that the statute violates the Charter of Freedoms and is unenforceable as a restriction on the practice of religion. At the end of the period covered by this report, a complaint by former FLDS members based on denial of human rights was pending before the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal. The Government issued deportation orders on the grounds of illegal extended residence in the country for three foreign wives who alleged they were married to a former FLDS bishop. The women alleged that the Government's refusal to grant them residence based on their claimed marriage to a Canadian citizen constituted religious persecution. Citizenship and Immigration Canada denied their petition for humanitarian and compassionate parole, and the women filed appeals in court, which were pending at the period covered by this report.

There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees in the country.

Forced Religious Conversion

There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States.

Section III. Societal Abuses and Discrimination

The generally amicable relationship among religious groups in society contributed to religious freedom.

According to the June 2005 Council of American-Islamic Relations Canada [CHAIR Canada]'s report, Presumption of Guilt: A National Survey on Security Visitations of Canadian Muslims, there was increasing concern in the Muslim community about visits by security officials, both at home and in the workplace. According to the report, authorities made a disproportionate number of visits to Arab males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. The report detailed seven specific cases in which security officials were alleged to have discouraged legal representation, failed to provide proper identification, or used threats and threatening behavior in the course of their interviews.

Throughout the period covered by this report, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) continued its outreach program, established in April 2005 in major cities, to ensure that all persons are treated equally and with respect in national security investigations. The program included community-based committees with members of the Muslim and Arab minorities to serve as avenues for communication on national security and cultural sensitivity matters. It also contained sensitivity training programs taught by individual ethnic and religious community members that were used to address allegations of insensitivity.

The B'nai Brith Canada's League for Human Rights received 829 reports of anti‑Semitic incidents in 2005, a 3.3 percent decrease compared to 2004. The highest number of reports came from Ontario Province (544 incidents, 418 of which took place in the Greater Toronto area), followed by Quebec Province (133 incidents, 127 of which took place in Montreal); approximately 80 percent of the Jewish population resided in these two provinces. B'nai Brith also reported significant regional increases in reports received in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and the Maritime Provinces. Both Montreal and Winnipeg showed significant decreases from the 2004 numbers. The 829 reports included 531 cases of harassment, 273 cases of vandalism, and 25 cases of violence. Of these, 167 cases involved attacks on synagogues, Jewish homes, or communal buildings. Jewish students reported 48 cases of anti-Semitic incidents that occurred on campus, and another 48 involved school settings. The B'nai Brith League also noted a marked increase in web-based hate, with 161 reports, including 34 cases of targeted hate by e-mail.

On July 8, 2005, a Saskatoon court found the former leader of the Assembly of First Nations guilty of willfully promoting hatred against Jews under the hate propaganda provisions of the criminal code and fined him $850 (C$1,000). The charges stemmed from remarks made in a 2002 public address to the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations. Claiming that the defendant's remarks were part of a private conversation, the defendant's lawyer launched a successful appeal in a Saskatchewan court that on June 8, 2006, set aside the earlier ruling and ordered a new trial. On June 19, the Saskatchewan Justice Department announced its plans to appeal the decision to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.

In November 2005 the attorney general of Ontario charged a man with committing hate crimes, as well as with seven counts of mischief under $4,250 (C$5,000) and two counts of threatening death. The charges stemmed from incidents in 2004 targeting Muslims, Arabs, and Jews at Ryerson University in which the accused spray‑painted anti-Muslim graffiti in the multifaith prayer room on campus and anti-Semitic graffiti elsewhere around the university campus. The case was pending at the end of the period covered by this report.

A number of mosques were vandalized, including several mosques in the Montreal area, in February and March 2006. At the end of the period covered by this report, police had not identified suspects in these incidents. This followed media coverage of the international reaction to publication in Denmark of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. In April 2006 a mosque in the Quebec city of Trois Rivieres, home to approximately 300 Muslims, was targeted with racist posters.

During the same period, approximately forty-five acts of vandalism against Christian cemeteries and churches were identified in the media. On June 27, 2006, a Manitoba court sentenced three individuals to prison terms of two years minus one day to three years for the arson destruction of a 105-year-old church. An amount of $1 million (C$1.2 million) was levied against the three as restitution. The individuals, followers of a Norwegian musician jailed for a 1993 murder and for the destruction of several churches in Europe, set the church ablaze on February 12, 2006, the Norwegian convict's birthday. The individual receiving the stiffest sentence had previously been charged with arson in an April 2004 fire that destroyed another church and with the vandalism of tombstones in Manitoba and Alberta. He was scheduled to appear in court on August 3, 2006.

In May 2006 St. Alban's Anglican Church, located in a Victoria, British Columbia, suburb was vandalized. Church lights and stained glass windows were smashed, Bibles and other religious objects were desecrated, and cigarette butts and empty wine bottles were left in and around the church. Police made arrests in the case, but by the end of the period covered by this report, authorities had not charged anyone. Church officials indicated they did not plan to press charges.

Following the June 2, 2006, arrests of seventeen individuals with "Muslim" names in the Toronto area on alleged terrorism charges, several anti-Muslim incidents occurred in various locations, including in Montreal and Toronto. On June 9 a Montreal imam was threatened with a knife outside his mosque, leading to the arrest of the alleged attacker. Police charged the individual with armed assault, uttering threats, and possession of a dangerous weapon; the suspect was released on bail while the investigation continued. On June 3 vandals broke windows and damaged cars parked at the Rexdale mosque in northwest Toronto. Police classified the attack as a hate crime and continued their search for the perpetrators while increasing patrols at all mosques in the city to prevent further vandalism. Muslim and non-Muslim community leaders and government officials were among those who urged calm and referred to the averted criminal acts as "motivated by politics and hatred, not by any religion or faith."

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. government discusses with the Government [of Canada] ways to promote religious freedom and other human rights throughout the world.


Released on September 15, 2006


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Christianity Today [links below under "Further Research"]

The U.S. Department of State released its eighth annual report on international religious freedom today. Associated Press highlights the report's criticism of Iran, but what the report's says (or rather, doesn's say) about Saudi Arabia may be the real news. Saudi Arabia is still listed as a "country of particular concern"—along with Iran, Vietnam, Burma, China, Eritrea, North Korea, and Sudan—but U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom chair Felice Gaer says the commission "is simply shocked that the Department removed longstanding and widely quoted language from its report that freedom of religion does not exist in Saudi Arabia." The state department's own report, she notes, says "There generally was no change in the status of religious freedom during the reporting period." But John Hanford, the U.S. ambassador at large for international religious freedom, said at this morning's press conference, "We see things moving in the right direction" in Saudi Arabia.

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Further Research:

* Document found on AllAmericanPatriotx.com

* Christianity Today [scroll to item #5]Remarks of Mdm. Condolezza Rice, Secretary of State, regarding IntntnlRlgsFrdm Document (Sep17,2k6)

* Text and Index by Countries, 8th Annual Report, IntrntnlRlgsFrdm Report 2006

* US says Iran is restricting religous freedom

* USCIRF "Simply Shocked" At State Department's Unwarranted Softening of Assessment of Saudi Arabia in Annual Report on International Religious Freedom

* What Happened to Religion in Canada? [by Gary Miedema] How our neighbor to the north lost its faith. Reviewed by Mark Noll

Turkey's 'secularism' a contradictory and fragile brake on extremist religious nationalism, but doesn't help Christians or Jews

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Turkey: Little progress on religious freedom

by Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio, a Catholic charity headquartered in Germany. Dr. Oehring's analysis was first published Jul28,2k6, and is republished here with permission of Forum 18 which is a Christian initiative dedicated to "the right to believe, to worship and witness, the right to change one's belief or religion, the right to join together and express one's belief." Forum 18 is based in Oslo, Norway.-------------------------------------
The Turkish parliament has now departed for the holidays – without approving the new Law on Foundations as it had been expected to do. The proposed Law would regulate how "community foundations" – the organisations allowed to some non-Muslim ethnic/religious communities - own and recover property. Parliament said it would come back early from holiday and reconvene in September, rather than October, to consider this proposed law and other laws aimed to bring Turkish laws into line with European Union (EU) norms. The aim is, reportedly, to approve at least the Foundations Law before the EU reports again on accession in early October.

Although politicians and the EU are concentrating now on the Foundations Law, this focuses only on one fairly narrow issue: what to do with buildings and other property taken from religious communities by the government and sold to third parties (see F18News 13 December 2005). The government cannot now give these properties back, so it will have to offer compensation. However, it is not willing to do so and parliamentary deputies think Turkey should not offer such compensation. As the European Commission is telling the Turkish government it must do so, the issue is deadlocked.

Despite the urging of the European Commission's Enlargement Directorate-General that Turkey should use the good offices of the Council of Europe, both to help it understand what needs to be done in the area of religious freedom and to help draw up laws on religious freedom and the status of religious communities, the Turks are reluctant. In April 2006, the Turkish government contacted the European Commission to ask for specialists who could advise on these issues. The EU was willing to send three experts, two from the Council of Europe as well as a French expert on "laicism". But to the astonishment of those involved, the day before the experts were due to travel the Turkish government informed them there was "no need" to come.

The involvement of the Council of Europe in helping Turkey's transformation is very tricky. Its Venice Commission – which advises on how constitutions and other fundamental laws could conform to European democratic standards – could help Turkey on religious freedom, but can only get involved if Turkey invites it to do so. But Turkey is not interested.

Official religious affiliation records

One small step has been taken in the way the state records individuals' religious affiliation. A new Personal Status Law approved on 25 April gives citizens for the first time the possibility to ask the authorities to remove information about their religious affiliation (or presumed religious affiliation) from their official records. However, the law is contradictory: while Article 35 paragraph 2 allows individuals to ask for their religious affiliation to be removed from their records or amended, Article 7 paragraph 1(e) specifies that citizens have to provide such information.

Yet despite discussion for at least the past decade, Identity Cards still carry a section giving the holder's religion. One of the major contributors to the debate was Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who is now Turkey's President, in his former capacity as Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court. A committed secularist, he argued that, in a secular state, an individual's religion should not be mentioned in official documents.

Changing religious affiliation on an individual's personal records was possible before, but required an individual to do this through the courts. Fear of social ostracism or hostility meant that few did this.

Although the new Personal Status Law appears to be a positive step, this is not the case. In practice, individuals trying to change their religious affiliation in their official records could still face problems. For a start, they would have to tell officials – who could just record that the individual had requested to change their religious affiliation without actually changing it. At least this Law offers the possibility to remove any religious affiliation from individuals' Identity Card, but if this does not become common any official or police officer would then ask an individual why no religion was given. Giving no religion would be tantamount to an admission that the individual is possibly a Christian or a Jew - the only faiths apart from Islam allowed to be listed.

It remains unclear how many people have asked to change the affiliation on their official records since the new law came in. In the past, individuals did of course change their religion, but were not always prepared to do so publicly through the courts. The authorities have given conflicting numbers of such converts. In February 2005 the Interior Ministry's Directorate-General for Administration of the Provinces told parliament that 344 people had converted from Islam to Christianity between 1997 and 2004, while six had converted from Islam to Judaism. No converts to other faiths were mentioned. However, Minister of State Mehmet Aydin, quoting figures from the government's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) (see F18News 12 October 2005), said 368 people had converted "under the influence of missionary activities".

There is much hostility to the peaceful sharing of non-Islamic beliefs, which may have been a factor in the murder of Fr Andrea Santoro (see F18News 9 February 2006).

The way officials record religion on personal records is predictable. Children born to parents who are recorded as Muslims are automatically recorded as Muslim. De facto, only three religions are permitted in the records: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Atheists or non-believers are not in practice allowed as options. Nor are Baha'i or Jehovah's Witness, to take two other examples. It remains unclear whether this has now changed, though in practice the whims of the official are likely to override any official decision. And if an individual asks to change the religion on their identity card, there is no guarantee officials will also change it on their personal record on the national register. And when you need any official document, the first place officials look is on the register.

Islam, Islamic Minorities and Citizenship

In the Muslim world, there is a tradition that the nationality is Islam: the nation is the umma, the body of Muslim believers. The concept of citizenship separate from religion is not known in Islamic law and tradition. Despite the government's insistence that it is "secular", Turkey remains a deeply Islamic society so these views have a strong hold on the population.

For almost a quarter of a century, Alevi Muslims have been pushing for recognition as a distinct community able to organise themselves in accordance with their own beliefs. But in May, Professor Ali Bardakoglu, the head of the government's Diyanet - which controls all official Muslim life in Turkey, despite the claimed secularism of the state - declared once again that Alevis are de facto Sunni Muslims. This is like saying that all Protestants are Catholics. Predictably, Alevis were unhappy over this statement, which means that in practice, the government does not recognise that Alevis and Sunnis are different. The government maintains that Cem Houses, where Alevis worship, are not considered places of worship but cultural centres. "We're not against Cem Houses, but they're no alternative to mosques," is the government message.

The Alevis are divided as to how to respond to the government's attitude – some groups are broadly pro-government, some anti-government and some pro-Kurdish. The Republican Education Foundation, which is under Alevi control, is regarded as more ready to work with the government. It says it does not want to see a separate government body to handle Alevi affairs, but argues that taxes from Alevis are being used (or misused) solely on Sunni mosques and imams. It insists that as Alevis are Turkish citizens and taxpayers it wants to see their taxes used to support Alevi structures.

Islamic groups that do not regard themselves as being under government control – such as the Islamic brotherhoods (the Sunni Nakchibendis, Mevlevis and others as well as the Shi'ite Bektashis) or new Islamic movements (such as the Nurcus and Suleymancis) – are in practice left alone. Yet there is no chance that the government will recognise Muslim differences, even though Turkey has Sunnis, Alevis and a small Shia minority. This indicates that the government is not just Muslim, but specifically Sunni Muslim, despite its proclaimed secular nature.

Nationalism in Education

Discussion continues over changing the school curriculum to treat all faiths in Turkey in a new way. The Alevis – like other religious minorities – complain that no progress has been reached for their teachings to be mentioned in school curricula. Further, Alevis have warned that if the government does not introduce separate religious education for Alevi children, they will lodge a case against it at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg - to which Turkey is subject, as a member of the Council of Europe.

Education remains very nationalistic (see F18News 12 October 2005 ). Some officials of the EU and of EU member states have complained of what one privately described as "massive nationalistic indoctrination" in schools. So it is highly unfortunate that the Education and Culture chapter (Chapter 26) in the EU accession negotiations was opened and closed on the same day, without addressing this central point. Without change in the curriculum and teaching, there can be no progress in a society whose nationalism has a noticeable impact on social attitudes (see F18News 19 January 2006).

Non-Muslim Minorities

Meanwhile, tensions for religious minorities remain high, as evidenced by the murder of one Catholic priest and attacks on other priests this year. Speculation persists that the "deep state" – the nationalist circles in the army, police, National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), secret police and state administration which regard themselves as the custodians of the Ataturkist ideology - might have been behind the murder in February of Italian priest Fr Andrea Santoro in his church in the Black Sea port of Trabzon, an area well known as a nationalist stronghold. Other factors behind the murder are also suggested (see F18News 9 February 2006). Such attacks on priests could spread to other nationalist areas. Some Catholic leaders still have police outside their residences, though how an unarmed, plainclothes police officer could offer any protection remains unclear. Some wonder whether they are there more to listen to what those leaders are saying than to protect them.

Of course, all religious minority leaders remain under government surveillance, forcing them to be very cautious in everything they say – or to be willing to pay the price for their frankness. They know their telephones are occasionally tapped and mail is sometimes opened before it is delivered. "Walls have ears," religious minority leaders say. Secretive officials occasionally come to visit them to ask questions – people speculate that they are from the MIT secret police.

In what is seen by Turkish Christians as a continuing humiliation, all Christian Churches – whether their leaders and members are Turkish citizens or not – are regarded as foreign. This attitude persists, even though Christian communities were present on the territory of what is now Turkey many centuries before the Turkish state, its ancestor the Ottoman Empire, and Islam. Discussions between Christian Churches and the state are normally handled by the Foreign Ministry, or sometimes by another state authority chosen by the government. This humiliation is clearly deliberate.

Nothing has happened about plans for the Ecumenical Patriarchate to be able to reopen its seminary on the island of Heybeliada (Halki in Greek) in the Sea of Marmara, once famed for its scholarship throughout the Orthodox world. Closed in 1971, Turkey has grudgingly promised to reopen it under US and EU pressure, but that now seems further off than ever. Discussion has now fizzled out, though Patriarch Bartholomew always tries to raise the issue whenever he can. The Armenians saw their Holy Cross seminary in Istanbul closed at the same time, but have given up any hope to be allowed to reopen it as a separate institution. Armenian Patriarch Mesrop has instead proposed inaugurating a chair of Armenian Studies at one of Istanbul's state universities – so far with no result.

Pope Benedict's Planned Visit

The planned visit of Pope Benedict XVI, due in November 2006, could also raise tensions. Benedict is scheduled to meet the Turkish President and government in Ankara, and address a selected public in the capital. Presumably, the Pope will want to talk about relations between the Christian and Islamic worlds and seek to overcome ideas about the "clash of civilisations". The Turkish public is unlikely to be present. Any views they might have of the speech will be formed by how the local media covers it. In Istanbul, Benedict will meet the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch and other local religious leaders, as well as the Catholic community.

Most Turks either do not want the Pope to visit, or are indifferent to his visit. Some Western-oriented Turks welcome it, as they think it could help Turkish society better understand both the Catholic Church and western views of Islam. Some of these Turks also hope that the visit will help Turkey understand the progress it needs to make on religious freedom. But nationalists who strongly oppose Europe and accession to the EU – who are growing more influential – could cause headaches for the police during Benedict's visit.

The government too will be closely scrutinising the Pope's words for any hint of anything that could be interpreted as anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic. As soon as any comments are linked to Turks as a people and a society, problems will arise. The Pope will doubtless be very delicate.

The row stirred up by remarks about the Armenian genocide in the final years of the Ottoman Empire made by the Armenian Catholicos, Karekin II, on a visit in June is ostensibly related to a historical ethnic conflict dating back ninety years. But it is relevant to a discussion on religious freedom, especially as the Istanbul prosecutor's office decided to investigate the remarks for a possible prosecution of the Catholicos for "anti-Turkish remarks". The very prospect of a criminal case over these remarks shows the lack of freedom of speech. But whenever religious leaders are prosecuted there is a knock-on effect on the rights of the religious community. The Armenian Apostolic community – the largest of Turkey's Christian communities by far - was embarrassed by Karekin's remarks, knowing they will make their already precarious existence more difficult.

What Prospects for the Future?

The prospect of Turkey's EU accession seems to be the only thing capable of driving change in the area of religious freedom and human rights more widely. Yet the government is now not willing to enact change. Indeed, it is becoming ever more nationalist – even if this might simply reflect the AKP's need for votes from the nationalist constituency. It is careful not to show too openly that it is Islamist, as this would cause problems with the President and the military.

All this could change after the next parliamentary elections (due in late 2006 or early 2007) and the presidential election (due next year), if the current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins. If the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan – or a puppet – succeeds in becoming President, the Ataturk legacy could be changed. There will then not be a President willing to veto laws that contradict this legacy. This would definitely lead to a worsening climate for religious freedom. The position for Sunni Muslims would improve, while for Alevis the situation would remain as restrictive as it is now. Despite the religious differences with the majority population, the Sunnis are still seen as Turks. For other minorities – especially Christians – the situation would be worse.

Government officials sympathetic to the ideal of secularism – and secularists more widely – are growing increasingly concerned. They fear that, if the AKP substantially increases its vote at the next election, it would be strong enough to change the Constitution – even against the wishes of the opposition. It could also install a President from its ranks, who would not then veto laws deemed to be part of an Islamist agenda, as the current President has done.

Secularists in particular are afraid for the future. Turkish diplomats – who are already concerned over the changing mood among state officials as an increasing number of AKP supporters fill official positions – are very afraid of a fundamental change in the country's course. Many believe any sweeping AKP victory in the next national elections would speed up the replacement of state officials with AKP loyalists.

The old establishment is seeking to build up political forces attractive to the electorate, in a last-ditch bid to head off the AKP challenge. However, it remains unclear if the electorate will back them. Voters threw out the old establishment in disgust at its corruption and ineffectiveness. The AKP has been careful to be on its best behaviour during its current period in office.

Although there is much talk of a military coup in the event of such fundamental changes, no-one knows if the majority of army officers still support Ataturk-defined secularism – or if they would be prepared to back such an anti-Islamist coup.

Prospects for EU Accession

The level of optimism or pessimism over the future depends on who you talk to. Western-oriented Turks still hope EU accession negotiations will continue and that Turkey will eventually join the EU. They hope desperately that the process will generate its own momentum that would force the government, the administration and the army to look forward and support reforms. This could happen, but it looks unlikely.

As the general election looms, the government is doing nothing that could be seen as a positive step towards the reforms the EU would welcome.

Many observers are not optimistic. They do not believe the Turkish side – whether the current AKP government or the "deep state" – is interested in seeing such reforms. Many Turks have not even understood what religious freedom – for example as defined in the rights set out in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – actually means (see F18News 13 December). Or they understand it – but reject it. Turkey ratified the ECHR in 1954, but over 50 years later has yet to abide by it.

Ataturkists fear that granting religious freedom as outlined in the Convention would give power to the Islamists. Yet Paragraph 2 of the ECHR's Article 9 prevents the abuse of religious freedom by freedom's enemies. This states that "freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Indeed, Article 9 would safeguard a real separation of religion and the state, as the Ataturkists claim to want.

This fear is also felt on the EU side, which means that it too is increasingly reluctant to clearly advocate religious freedom along the lines of the ECHR. EU governments also fear such rights would open the doors to Turkey's Islamist groups. Although EU officials involved in the accession process are interested in seeing religious freedom promoted properly – indeed, they regard it as the second most important issue after recognition of Cyprus - they seem to know that this is seen as a political issue which is over their heads.

Many believe the accession negotiations will fail this autumn, not over democratisation and human rights, but over the Turkish government's refusal to recognise the government of Cyprus in Nicosia. Many Turks would not be unhappy at this. Yet if the EU suspends the accession negotiations, the Turks will feel insulted and spurned by Europe. Some believe the European Commission is therefore trying to manoeuvre to find a way for Turkey itself to suspend the negotiations.

Possible Impact on Religious Freedom

Yet any suspension will have a very negative impact on religious freedom – indeed, the position for religious minorities could end up being worse than when the negotiations started. Suspension would incite nationalist feelings and many Turks would openly say that the negotiations and even membership of the EU itself would not benefit Turkey. Then a hunt would begin for those who had caused the mess. Most Turks would not point to their own government but to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Armenian Patriarchate, the Catholic Church, the Protestants, and other obvious symbols of the outside world.

The only hope many can see for progress towards religious freedom is that the EU accession negotiations continue. If EU negotiations stop completely, no hope for religious freedom will remain. Yet even if the negotiations stagger on, it is doubtful that the majority of the population is prepared to change its attitude to nationalism and religion, and even consider accepting Alevis and non-Muslim Turks as full Turkish citizens. The only other possible hope is that the reform process will gather its own momentum independent of the EU. However, at present, there is little sign of this happening. (END)

- Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of , a Catholic charity based in Germany, contributed this comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.