Sunday, July 05, 2009

Literary: New Criterion litmag: Free Speech in an age of jihad -- a special pamphlet with a variety of writers

Free speech in an age of jihad



The reprint is $4, and $2 shipping and handling (more for international orders). Additional copies will be shipped at $1 additional shipping and handling per copy. For education discounts on orders of 25 or more, please call our assistant to the editors at (212) 247-6980,

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Libel tourism, “hate speech” & political freedom

With essays by
Roger Kimball, 1; Stanley Kurtz, 5; Robert Spencer, 16;
Andrew C. McCarthy, 23; & Mark Steyn, 32

Responses from
Rachel Ehrenfeld, Brooke Goldstein, Ezra Levant,
Ibn Warraq, Steven Emerson, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.,
Claudia Rosett, Robert H. Bork, Daniel Kornstein
& John J. Walsh

Enviro: Christians: UK's Steve Bishop writes up some of his own struggle for a Christian perspective on ecological crises

Steve Bishop, An Accidental Blog, reviews at considerable length the case made by an apparently excellent book, Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives - Past and Present edited by R. J. Berry (T&TClark International [ISBN 9780567030184] xii+348; £39.99).

Rather than discuss (argue with?) the book which is itself a collection of views, or with the presentation and critical observations and questions that this reformational thinker-reviewer offers, I thawt I'd just let readers know of Bishop's reflective take on this already reflective book. It may whet your appetite to get a copy for yourself. In any case, the review will go a long way in stimulating your own musings on this urgent set of concerns for the global home of humanity, God's good earth.

-- Albert Gedraitis, publisher, refWrite

Thursday, July 02, 2009

Philosophy: Government: The idea of "Open Govt" based on new techs and seemingly absolute transparency

Yeah, its all blamed on "technology enthusiasts" but there's more to this philosophical surge than the tech which enables it.GovernmentExecutive.com carries an engaging article by Robert Brodsky [rbrodsky "at" govexec "dot" com] Open government advocates map out future of citizen governance (Jun29,2k9).
>NEW YORK CITY-- Technology enthusiasts on Monday gathered at a jazz concert hall in Manhattan to plot ways to increase government transparency and accountability.

The young and technocratic audience at the sixth annual Personal Democracy Forum -- virtually every participant was working on a laptop or iPhone or Tweeting -- generally gave the Obama administration credit for moving the transparency ball forward with sites such as Recovery.gov and Data.gov.

The speakers, however, agreed that the new platforms are only the first step in a revolutionary change that will sweep across government in much the same way Craigslist and Wikipedia changed the private sector.

"We need for transparency to be the default government," said Jeff Jarvis, a columnist and blogger and the author of What Would Google Do? (Collins Business, 2009). "We need a government that is searchable, clickable and linkable."
I think the whole philosophoical underpinnings of this orientation are self-contradictory. It woud isolate communities, pulverize them electorally, and individualize citizens. From this the idea of every citizen forming an opinion on everything and voting on every issue, the very idea is exhausting. The model of "citizen" here is a super-informed and/or super-manipulated everyman, with no delegation of representation by voters who instead themselves must look at everything (transparency) and v?o?t?e?. Quite a notion of voter to be sure. So, having the notion of "open government" linked to that of "direct democracy" (so-called) is not only anti-representation but also anti-democratic except in the most extreme philosophically individualist concept of democracy. It only puts total responsiblity on everywoman/man, a responsibility I for one dont want to shoulder. This presupposition of "total individual responsiblity" in government, your responsiblity for everything that can happen or has happened in the governing of a given country is quite pernicious and intellectually dishonest. It is the preferred drug of activists, presently left activists, but if enacted woud become also the drug of r+twing activists. My point here: the direct democracy approach favors activists who have illusions about how much responsiblity they can take-on in an advanced h+ly-differentiated democratic society. So, under the transparency movement, beware of the other presuppositions of this advocacy that are the reverse of democracy, by destroying the importance of representation.

Now, representation does require reform. What we have now is representatives who dont even read the bills they compile. We've been lied to about a basic facet of transparency where a legal provision of posting on an accessible webpage woud protect us from tyrants who woud slip by us absurdly-written (rather, compiled) legislation, never posted a week in advance, and therefore opaque. Not transparent, not translucent.

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Philosophy of Law: Case Study: New Zealand, in a forthcoming study by Alan Cameron

integrative jurisprudence:

an interdisciplinary conceptual orientation
for the study of law



Alan Cameron's abstract, intro and outline (recent) to his forthcoming book. With some opening comments by Albert Gedraitis (May26,2k9)

Based at the School of Accounting and Commercial Law, under the Faculty of Commerce and Administration, Victoria University of Wellington in Wellington, New Zealand, Senior Lecturer Cameron locates his academic speciality in commercial law.

Perhaps even more importantly to many of us reformationals around the world, Cameron functions actively as a leading Juridical scholar, a professional in juridics who "reflects on the nature of law in relation to the distinctives of the New Zealand legal tradition and the wider legal developments around the world."

He is "a critical proponent of the Juridical philosophy developed by past professor of law at the Free University in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Dr Herman Dooyeweerd." Cameron, in his forthcoming book Integrative Jurisprudence, presents a path-breaking, creative reading of a famous Dutch scholar's philosophy of law, as mentioned, a philosophy that is transforming itself into an international philosophy of law now invigorated by finely detailed study of the exemplary legal system of New Zealand -- where common law necessarily includes both the main public jurisprudence and the large-indigenous population's own rules-wisdom, the latter both in the oral tradition of the Maori people, and nowadays sometimes written down. The two systems necessarily have collided at times, but both systems must interact and learn from their mistakes along the way. [I've taken much of the foregoing material from the Wikipedia entry, Alan Cameron (legal scholar)."]

Cameron is well-acquainted with his mentor's Encyclopedia of the Science of Law [Volume I (English translation 2003, Mellen Press; Dutch original, Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap (Studentenraad, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 1946-1967).)] Encyclopedia I has been published in English now for 6 years. Further, Cameron has worked at studying the full shelf of remaining volumes (5 in total), accessing partial translations as the forward-work proceeds by a team headed by philosopher and Dooyeweerd specialist, Dr Danie Strauss.

In Cameron's forthcoming study of Dooyeweerd's law philosophy, the law scholar purposely thinks thru his own country's legal system in all its uniqueness (difference and sameness) in relation to the other states and conditions of the world to which New Zealand must relate; in the course of which he sets up a dynamic relation between D's thawt, C's own contributions where, besides appropriating ins+ts, he may go even beyond his mentor with many new juridical ins+ts, and he does all this in in building his multidimensional understanding of his country and its legal system.

Readers may also want to hunt down as a kind of sampler, Cameron's recent paper, "Dooyeweerd on Law and Morality: Legal ethics -- a test case" (available in .PDF format for digital download).

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INTEGRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION FOR THE STUDY OF LAW

by Alan Cameron

Abstract
The book is an exposition of the jurisprudential perspective set forth in the Encyclopaedie der Rechtwetenschap (Encyclopedia of the Science of Law), a multi-volume jurisprudential conceptual framework and method developed by the late Professor Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). It is found in dictaten (typed and bound notes) produced by the Student Council at the Free University of Amsterdam for his students during his tenure of the Chair in Jurisprudence and Old Dutch Law in the Faculty of Law at the Free University of Amsterdam from 1926 until 1964). The Encyclopaedie was itself a particular application of an original general philosophical system (Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea) that emerged from Dooyeweerd’s initial wrestling with neo-Kantian legal theory. Its maturest expression was published in English as A New Critique of Theoretical Thought.

This application of the encyclopaedic method in this book contains some revisions and refinements of Dooyeweerd’s philosophical categories and method. These are largely attributable to developments introduced by Prof. DFM Strauss to whom I owe a debt of gratitude in developing my own understanding of Dooyeweerd’s general philosophy and his philosophy of law. Only the introductory part of Dooyeweerd’s major jurisprudential work has appeared in English to date, Encyclopedia of the Science of Law: Introduction (Mellen 2002), the first of four substantial volumes to be published in English. This exposition however, draws heavily on the substantive parts of the Encyclopedia contained in the unpublished volumes.

The integrative jurisprudence and it method arises out of a critique of the main traditions of Western philosophy general, legal philosophy and its roots. It rests upon a particular account of the nature of theory and theorizing in relation to its subject matter. Applied to the field of legal study it results in an original legal epistemology (theory of legal knowledge) and ontology (theory of legal phenomena).

This main focus of this book is upon the ontology in order to achieve its chief aim of providing a conceptual orientation for the study of law. Unlike other jurisprudence texts it is not intended to be merely an introduction to different theories of law and/or to a few selected traditional topics involving debates amongst contending perspectives, that is, an introduction to jurisprudence as a distinct subject of legal theory within the legal curriculum. More ambitiously, it is intended to present a view of jurisprudence as a more or less comprehensive conceptual framework for the special academic discipline of law. For that reason it will devote less attention than other jurisprudential works to the detailed examination of different legal philosophies.

Briefly stated, the integrative perspective as an ontology of law comprises three central elements: the modal or aspectual, the entitary or typical-structural and the “enkaptic” or structurally interconnecting element. However, the most original and fundamental element is that of the theory of modal aspects. A key idea in this legal philosophy is that of the jural aspect as one of a diversity of irreducible but interconnected universal aspects of social reality.

Grounded in a cosmic law theory this theory of law, understandably, is prone to be categorised within the natural law tradition of legal philosophy. However, it will be seen that there are important features of this perspective that bear a strong similarity to, or are shared in common with, key features of other traditional (e.g. analytical legal positivism) and more recent movements or schools of legal philosophy including critical legal theories, law and economics and, especially in its underlying critique of Enlightenment rationalism, postmodern legal thought, central elements of which had already been anticipated in Dooyeweerd’s philosophical critique.

Finally, an auxilliary, but nonetheless important feature of this work, is the conscious attempt by the author to utilise, though not exclusively, a wide range of New Zealand scholarly legal material – sources of law, legal doctrine and theory - to both illustrate and explicate the concepts and method employed. In this way it is hoped to give increased relevance to the exposition of the theoretical concepts for the New Zealand student; contribute towards a distinctively New Zealand jurisprudence in both the theoretical and non-theoretical senses of jurisprudence explained in the first section of the introductory chapter; and further the existing inter-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary dialogue amongst New Zealand legal and non-legal scholars. Though there is a conscious New Zealand bias in the illustrative material this should only be regarded as localised application of an approach that thinks globally as befits a true philosophy of law. This work is intended to demonstrate the possibility of its application within the common law tradition by way of illustration within the local jurisdiction. The last section which includes a discussion of international law should help to deflect criticism of parochialism in the illustrative legal subject matter.

Part One: Introduction

Chapter 1: An Overview
Nature, role and function of jurisprudence

Within the study of law jurisprudence is a term that can be used with different though related meanings. When legal scholars refer to the jurisprudence of the Treaty of Waitangi they are referring to the actual law itself as well as the “wisdom” it contains, jurisprudence in its literal meaning (legal wisdom). Jurisprudence in this sense includes the learning, principles, concepts and doctrines contained within the formal legal sources of court decisions and legislation. It may also encompass learned scholarly commentary or treatises on the law itself. However jurisprudence, taught as a distinct subject within the law curriculum, has a narrower meaning that refers to theory of law. It encompasses, both general philosophy of law as found in the history of the ideas of leading thinkers, as well as more narrowly focused theories of specific areas of law such as tort, contract, public law etc. and the concepts associated with those branches of law.

I will discuss, in this chapter subsection, debates about the place of jurisprudence in the law curriculum: – should it be compulsory? should it be in a separate course? Or should it be an essential element of all law courses? This serves as a lead-in to 1.2 where I set forth the “integrative” view of the role of jurisprudence within the study of law generally

1.2 Relation of jurisprudence to discipline of law and legal phenomena:
Neil MacCormick’s Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence will be taken as example of a view of jurisprudence in its relation to the discipline law to which the integrative approach is compared.

1.3 Some key features of integrative jurisprudence
This will include comparison with features of other perspectives: interdisciplinary grounded in the coherence of reality and our experience of it “transcendental-empirical”a descriptive-normative/analytical theory oriented to fit an empirical normative jural reality that nonetheless exceeds (transcends) the ability of analytical/theoretical concepts to fully capture pluralist rejects “mono-legal”/positivist theories of law and identifies a rich plurality of expressions of the jural dimension in diverse societal spheres reflected in a socio-structural taxonomy of law normative coherence the interconnection of concepts expresses the inner coherence of the jural dimension of social experience in its plural expressions
open is open to revision within and outside of its perspective to engage in dialogue with other perspectives critical solidarity acknowledges commonalities with, and contributions of, other theories from different perspectives without abandoning its own standpoint commitment-explicit exposure of root beliefs underlying the theory – the failure of other theories to identify their own root beliefs is a self-critical deficit in those theories

PART TWO: AN INTEGRATIVE VIEW OF LAW

Chapter 2: Law, Discipline of Law, Legal Theory and its Roots


2.1 What is law?

Distinguish this descriptive/analytical (theoretical) question from a related theoretical question: What is a law? and from the question for the practitioner/scholar-doctrinalist/student of law: What is the law? Is this latter “practical” question connected to the former theoretical questions? If so, how? This section does not answer these questions so much as discuss what sort of questions they are in the context of the study of law and how they interrelate. This section therefore only provides preliminary intimations of the answers to the questions that are elaborated more fully by the integrative approach in the following sections and chapters.

2.2 What is the discipline (study) of law?

2.3 What is the role of theory in the study of law? Philosophy and the academic disciplines

2.4 The reason-transcending roots of philosophical perspectives in disciplinary theories – legal theory in particular

Chapter 3: Outline of An Integrative Conceptual Perspective on Law

3.1 Basic Jural concepts: the modal dimension of law
3.1.1 Basic jural concepts: elementary
3.1.2 Basic jural concepts: complex
3.1.3 The concept of law

3.2 Basic cosmic relations expressed in the jural aspect of reality
3.2.1 Universal side and individual side
3.2.2 Norm side and fact side
3.2.3 Subject-object relation
3.2.4 Origination-duration-termination
3.3 Jural ideas
3.3.1 Jural concept and jural idea: the concept of law and the idea of justice
3.3.2 Jural morality
3.3.3 Justice as a jural-moral idea

3.4 Jural entity-type concepts: jural entities and their inter-connections
3.4.1 The diversity of human (jural) type-structures
3.4.2 Basic (modal) concepts and entity-type concepts: the role of the sociology of law
3.4.3 Jural form and substance: originating forms of law and their material sources
3.4.4 The interweaving of laws having differing material sources
3.4.5 The private-public distinction in the light of jural entity-type concepts:

3.5.1 The interweaving of private and public law

Part Three: Applications of the Integrative Perspective

Chapter 4: Contract and Contract Law: Two Jural Realities


4.1 Contract distinguished from contract law
4.2 Doctrines of contract formation and their conundra
4.3 Private and public law of contract

Chapter 5: Indigenous Law: Legal Pluralism and the Role of Cultural-Historical Differentiation

Chapter 6: The University: Interconnected Jural Plurality

Part Four: Jurisprudential Challenges

Chapter 7: Law and Justice in a Global Perspective: International Law

Chapter 8: - Know Yourself: Law’s Need of an Integrated Theory of the Human Person

Friday, May 15, 2009

Sciences: Space Explore: NASA launches Kepler Mission (agency's 10th Discovery mission) to look for Earth-like planets



KEPLER MISSION: A search for habitable planets. -- official website offers this succinct summary of the project (but don't miss the whole item "Importance of Planet Detection").
The Kepler Mission, NASA Discovery mission #10, is specifically designed to survey our region of the Milky Way galaxy to discover hundreds of Earth-size and smaller planets in or near the habitable zone and determine how many of the billions of stars in our galaxy have such planets.

Results from this mission will allow us to place our solar system within the continuum of planetary systems in the Galaxy.
Magnalia Dei!, as Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) m+t be saying.
Kepler was forced to leave his teaching post at Graz [Germany] due to the [Roman Catholic] counter Reformation because he was Lutheran and moved to Prague [Czech Republic nowadays] to work with the renowned Danish astronomer, Tycho Brahe. He inherited Tycho's post as Imperial Mathematician when Tycho died in 1601. Using the precise data that Tycho had collected, Kepler discovered that the orbit of Mars was an ellipse. In 1609 he published Astronomia Nova, delineating his discoveries, which are now called Kepler's first two laws of planetary motion. And what is just as important about this work, "it is the first published account wherein a scientist documents how he has coped with the multitude of imperfect data to forge a theory of surpassing accuracy" (O. Gingerich in foreword to Johannes Kepler New Astronomy translated by W. Donahue, Cambridge Univ Press, 1992), a fundamental law of nature. Today we call this the scientific method.
Do not miss, in the just-quoted text, how the scientific method is defined, while attributing this pioneering usage of its mathematics-enriched method to Dr Kepler: "a scientist documents how he has coped with the multitude of imperfect data to forge a theory of surpassing accuracy" (O. Gingerich, in the Forward).

Sunday, May 03, 2009

Philosopher Benson fabricates some jejune generalizsations re PoMo's Derrida, but casts l+t on D's "Cambridge Affair"

Philosophy Now pits philosopher Peter Benson against his Quinine mentors in favour of Jacques Derrida.

Here's the bombastic title:

Here's the blurb: "Peter Benson tries to clear Jacques Derrida’s unjustly infamous name, and shows how memes spread in modern academia."

Here's the opening foray by Benson:
The doorbell rings. I hurry to answer it and find, standing on the doorstep, a man and woman dressed in dark clothes, with bright smiles on their faces. “Good Morning!” they greet me, boundlessly cheerful, “We are visiting people in this area to bring you a copy of our magazine.” And they triumphantly hold aloft a flimsy publication entitled THE TRUTH! in large strident lettering.

I am immediately seized by panic. “I’m terribly sorry,” I hurriedly say, “I haven’t time to talk. I’m just in the middle of sacrificing a goat.” And I quickly close the door in their astonished faces.

I suspect that most readers of Philosophy Now would react in a similar way. Anyone who, out of the blue, wants to bring the Truth to me (or to bring me to the Truth) should be viewed with suspicion. I have got along just fine without this Truth of theirs, and I’m not so sure that I need it now. This cannot be attributed to a lack of curiosity. I am fascinated by facts of many kinds – scientific facts, historical facts, biographical facts – and I am well aware that I still have much to learn. Numerous truths, of various varieties, await my discovery. It is only when I am offered The Truth (with a capital ‘T’), singular and domineering, that I become wary.

I feel equally suspicious when a book of philosophy sets out to tell me Why Truth Matters (Continuum, 2006). On the face of it, this is not a mysterious puzzle. When we ask a question (such as “Where is the nearest railway station?”) we would generally prefer a true answer to a false one. The reasons are fairly obvious! But the authors of this book (Ophelia Benson and Jeremy Stangroom) are convinced that Truth is under siege, that its importance is widely denied, and that they need to come to its aid. Ought we perhaps to regard them with the same caution as we would bring to our pair of doorstep preachers?
So, this is a book review, after all.

----------------------------------------------
Ophelia Benson and Jeremy Stangroom,
Why Truth Matters (Continuum, 2006)
reviewed by Peter Benson
---------------------------------------------

Is Ophelia B. of any direct relation to Peter B?
The aims of the book may seem admirable enough, as the authors catalogue various examples of ideological prejudice and political correctness overriding established facts. These examples are mostly drawn from such fields as sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies. Yet the authors clearly believe that the original well-spring of such challenges to truth lies within philosophy. They declare their principal targets to be “Postmodernism, epistemic relativism, anti-realism…. And so on.” (p.18) And they later suggest that the origin of these fashionable ideas may have been, in part, “just a brain wave in the head of Jacques Derrida” (p.167) They may be surprised, therefore, to learn that in the book he wrote in collaboration with Catherine Malabou ( Counterpath, Stanford University Press, 2004) Derrida speaks of attending “a meeting on ‘Postmodernism and Religion’ – two things which are foreign to me.” (p.95). Many similar disavowals can be found in his works.
But other perhaps even contradictory themes tells us that religion at least is not so absolutely "foreign" to Derrida, after all, as Catholic philosopher Caputo and Reformational philosopher Olthuis can attest.
Many books and articles in recent years have announced a desire to defend Truth against Postmodern attack. But who exactly are these postmodern philosophers, who treat Truth so lightly? And what exactly is postmodernism?
I've only read one book by Derrida, Of Grammatology which comes with a 70-page introduction by the translator that sets an ideological frame around the book that it isn't really justified. It was that book with that frame which blazed its way thru the American literary scholarship, starting within Yale University's litcrit culture of identity politics. Tho, there it wasn't emphasized how much Derrida was influenced by James Joyce whom the French-educated Algerian Jew read when he was 18, during an exchange year at Harvard. Something like that.

John Caputo (emeritus Villanova), the Augustinian Catholic philosopher-befriender of Derrida, and Caputo's colleague, James Olthuis (emeritus Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto) a reformational Christian philosopher, have written searchingly on Derrida and the religionality or not, of his philosophy and piety as an honest, playful human creature philosophizing. One of Olthuis' students, Jamie K.A. Smith, has become a big Derrida-booster at Calvin College, where he is a professor.

See also: Deconstruction-and-religion

Sunday, April 19, 2009

Economics as a science has run stuck on 2 of its major modern generalities,'rational' investors & 'perfectly efficient' markets

Anatole Kaletsky, in a major article in a UK online magazine Prospect, contributes a stunning set of thawts, "Goodbye, homo economicus" (Apr2k9). I shall quote only the tail-end of his piece here, but recommend a close reading of the entire piece to encounter its moments of truth.
Economics today is a discipline that must either die or undergo a paradigm shift—to make itself both more broadminded, and more modest. It must broaden its horizons to recognise the insights of other social sciences and historical studies and it must return to its roots. Smith, Keynes, Hayek, Schumpeter and all the other truly great economists were interested in economic reality. They studied real human behaviour in markets that actually existed. Their insights came from historical knowledge, psychological intuition and political understanding. Their analytical tools were words, not mathematics. They persuaded with eloquence, not just formal logic. One can see why many of today’s academics may fear such a return of economics to its roots.

Academic establishments fight hard to resist such paradigm shifts, as Thomas Kuhn, the historian of science who coined the phrase in the 1960s, demonstrated. Such a shift will not be easy, despite the obvious failure of academic economics. But economists now face a clear choice: embrace new ideas or give back your public funding and your Nobel prizes, along with the bankers’ bonuses you justified and inspired.
Related to Kaletsky's piece is a review in The New Republic:
[Judge] Richard A. Posner, "Shorting Reason," (Ap15,2k9) on the book by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, (Princeton University Press, 264 pp., USA$24.95).

If you want to pursue these issues in conjunction with "Capitalism beyond the crisis," you can do so by reading Amartya Sen's essay of that title in The New York Review of Books (Mar26,2k9).

Reformational Christian philosophy has already discarded propositionalism in Bible reading (Dooyeweerd, Hart, ICS Toronto generally, etc), so why should not our economists and sociologists also do so? -- all the while struggling in search of Christian philosophy's relation to "Scriptural religion" (Vollenhoven, Hart again, and most recently, interestingly and conservingly Albert Wolters, "No Longer Queen: the theological disciplines and their sisters" which is downloadable in PDF format). So, it is no surprise that the leading philosophizing economist of this school of thawt, Dr Bob Goudzwaard, at the same time uses scripture-bases to movitate his discussion of economic-modal norms. While devoted to his contribution over a lifetime, I'm not so sure he and my discussion-partner sociologist Dr Bruce Wearne have remained reformationally realistic, in Robert Joudstra's sense, Recovering Christian Realism in "Terrifying Times". Or, perhaps I'm reading intertextually with the echoes of Rheinhold Niebuhr's christian realism.

Sunday, April 12, 2009

Theory of the State, Somalia's Status, World Situation regarding Pirate Bases

A commenter, Life of the Mind, on Belmont Club at Pajamas Media, responding to a blog entry by Richard Fernandez, "Then there was one pirate" (July 12,2k9) gives us some keen observations around recent events off the Somali coast of Africa.
...a hypothetical. Let us say that the United States dispensed with the legal fiction that Somalia was a normal state with a functioning government possessing the attributes of sovereignty, including defined borders, a monopoly on violence and effective governance. At this time the United States holds that every land territory on earth outside of Antarctica, which is governed as is the Moon by a special treaty status, is part of some functioning nation state. Until fairly recent times there were three categories of territory and the inhabitants of them each were under a different status.

First were the Westphalian Nation States, responsible for their own conduct and that of their citizens. These included the European Empires, the United States, The Ottoman Empire (despite acknowledged problems) Japan, China (more problems) and Latin American countries (occasional problems.) Second were the dependancies, protectorates or colonies of the nations in the first category. To varying degrees the senior partner assumed responsibility for the conduct of these territories and of their inhabitants in international relations. For example, if a native of an Indian Princely State in treaty relationship with the British Crown got arrested in Berlin then the British embassy would see that certain basic rights were observed. The United States would I believe have been in a similar position for a member of an Native American Indian tribe before all Native American were granted citizenship. Third were wild and unclaimed territories inhabited by savages or aborigines who were outside the law of nations. There have not been any such territories that I am aware of since Africa was divided up at the Berlin Conference of 1884.

So if the United States declared that we held that Somalia had reverted to the status of unexplored Africa of 125 years ago what would change? For one thing it would change the status of Somalis who encounter the military or legal agents of another country. Right now if a Somali is in the United States they are either here pursuant to their being admitted with a visa or they are on temporary parole or they entered without inspection (EWI) but even in the last case they have some limited rights. Those rights are partly in US domestic law but also because both the United States and Somalia are signatories to treaties in which we agree to treat each others nationals with a certain level of courtesy. Right now if a police officer found a Somali in Minneapolis standing over a body with a gun in his hand the officer would be expected to politely disarm and apprehend the individual and then respond to his request for aide by putting him in touch with his country’s diplomats. In fact it is now almost unheard of for a law enforcement officer to inquire as to whether a suspect is legally in the United States. If the suspect was from a country whose government we did not have relations with, like Iran or North Korea, they would still have rights and some access to a diplomat who would act in their interest. If Somalia, or some other place, was considered truly lawless then that would change. In theory the officer could determine that they had entered without inspection and that would place the alien in the status of being an invading enemy combatant who was out of uniform and therefore not subject to the protections of the Geneva Protocols. The officer could then in theory kill the alien but it would probably not be a career enhancing move.
Good stuff to mull over, not least of all should you, like me, follow generally Dooyeweerd's theory of the state as expressed in his monumental New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Along those lines, I also note references I encountered recently on the Internet that have added the category "failed states" to the widely used term "rogue states" (North Korea long being the outstanding case of the latter). At least two categories are needed in addition to LifeoftheMind's well-defined and historical definition of a "normal state." Somalia may not be a state at all, but it needs some designation for the completeness of the theory; Somalia is quite different from the rogue state of North Korea.

I'm grateful this Easter Day that Captain Richard Phillips and the US Navy SEAL sharpshooters who rescued. Piracy is the product of extreme poverty and lawlessness in the ungoverned zone called Somalia, run by warlords. The major industry there is khat cultivation, the marijuana-like product is sold openly in public marketplaces in Somaliland. May God have mercy on this weapons-overloaded poor country and its people.

-- Owlb